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Résumé 
La démographie a toujours influencé la pensée politique. La décision récente d’aug-
menter l’âge à la pension dans beaucoup de pays développés est inspirée par l’évo-
lution importante de la composition par âge de la population. Mais il y a en réalité 
peu d’arguments pour augmenter l’âge à la retraite si l’on tient compte de l’ensem-
ble des données démographiques et économiques. Une interprétation souvent 
trop simpliste et même parfois erronée d’indicateurs démographiques contribue à 
cette démarche. L’utilisation systématique d’indicateurs démographiques dans la 
discussion sur la viabilité du système des pensions et de la sécurité sociale est selon 
nous souvent inspirée par la théorie de l’économie de l’offre. Un aspect crucial est 
le fait que la croissance de la productivité est ignorée ou minimisée. À cet égard, la 
discussion actuelle présente une profonde similitude avec l’approche Malthusienne 
de la population. 
Mots clés 
Vieillissement de la population, espérance de vie, paradigme Malthusien, taux de 
dépendance. 
Abstract 
Demography always influenced political thinking. The recent decision to increase 
the age of retirement in many high-income countries is driven by a dramatic chan-
ge in the age composition of the population. We argue that there is in fact no need 
to increase the age of retirement and that many aspects of the current evolution 
both in demography and in economy are overlooked. Moreover, some demograph-
ic indicators such as life expectancy or the dependency ratio are often interpreted 
in a simplistic and erroneous way. The systematic use of demographic indicators to 
discuss the sustainability of the pension system and of the social security system is 
in our view often inspired by the supply-side way of economic thinking. A crucial 
aspect is that productivity increase is ignored or minimalized in the discussion. In 
this regard the discussion has many similarities with the Malthusian approach of 
the population question. 
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In the past 100 years, life expectancy of Belgian men increased by 28 
years (49 to 77) and that of Belgian women by 30 years (53 to 83) 
(HMD). In a much shorter time frame – since 1950 –, life expectancy 
worldwide increased by no less than 22 years, from 46 to 68 years 
(United Nations, 2013). The mortality decline is by any standard one of 
the most important achievements of mankind. But instead of praising 
this development, we ended up fearing it. Press articles and politicians 
talk about it not as a success story, but as a problem: the spectre of age-
ing populations. And one of the main conclusions is that «as we live 
longer, we will have to work longer». 
Why do we need to work longer? The idea is based on two arguments. 
First, we, as a society, cannot afford to pay for so many unproductive 
persons. A crude demographic indicator, the dependency ratio, under-
pins this first argument. The second reasoning is slightly different. It is 
based on the observation that most people are indeed living longer than 
their parents. As we are living longer, why should we not work longer? 
The idea is based on the interpretation of another demographic indica-
tor: life expectancy. 
Demography is thus at the core of one of the main societal discussions of 
our time: the revision of our social security system and, more generally, 
the relationship between work and income. In our opinion, this discus-
sion is flawed, because it is largely fuelled by two wrong ideas. The first 
misleading idea is associated with the spectacular growth in life expec-
tancy at birth, which creates the incorrect perception, even among de-
mographers, that the human species is conquering immortality and is no 
longer ageing. The second wrong idea is on the ineluctability of demo-
graphic processes and their inevitable consequences, the so-called TINA 
option («there is no alternative»). Demography is one of the factors 
changing our societies and creating new challenges. But the solutions 
we choose are based on political choices and we can follow many differ-
ent strategies to cope with these new challenges. Much too often the 
demographic fact is presented as having inevitable implications, leaving 
no other options open. 
In this paper we will briefly develop five points. Firstly, we will evaluate 
the spectacular increase in life expectancy over the past century. Sec-
ondly, we will discuss the implications of this increase for the future 
evolution of life expectancy. Thirdly, we will address the question of the 
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sustainability of ageing populations. In a fourth point, we link the ques-
tion of sustainability to that of the mandatory retirement age. A final 
section reflects on the relation between demography and politics. Each 
of these points would deserve a more in-depth discussion, but the aim of 
this paper is to link these together to illustrate how the interpretation of 
demographic indicators has influenced the political agenda. 
Are we really living longer? 
Evolution in life expectancy versus length of human life span 
Many people are convinced that humans are becoming increasingly old. 
An often-heard example to support this conviction is that the seventy-
year-old of today is the sixty-year-old of half a century ago. And indeed, 
the probability of dying at age 70 today in Belgium dropped to the prob-
ability of dying at age 60 thirty years ago2. Yet, the probability of dying 
is not quite the same as the process of ageing. The revolution of our time 
is not in an alteration of the ageing process, but that modern societies 
control far better all risk factors for premature death and, hence, create 
the opportunity for each of us to reach the «normal» age characteristic 
of the human species’ biological clock.  
The progress in life expectancy creates in the public at large a belief, 
propagated by some scientists (de Grey, 2005)3, that we are at the verge 
of achieving immortality and that we are no longer ageing – the ideology 
of the forever young. From a psychological point of view, this belief is a 
strong argument to accept the fact that in the long run we will have to 
work longer (van Solinge, Henkens, 2010). In a milder and less extreme 
version, the following statement is often repeated: that, compared to fif-
                                                        
2. This shift in equivalent mortality rates to older ages is also compressed by age. 
Observation over a century shows that 87-year-olds in 2010 have the same mortality 
rate as the 77-year-olds in 1910, the 94-year-olds in 2010 compare to the 87-year-olds 
in 1910 and the 99-year-olds to the 94-year-olds. 
3. Most prominent among these scientists is Aubrey de Grey and his SENS (Strat-
egies for Engineered Negligible Senescence) Research Foundation. Although sharply 
criticised by other scientists, de Grey received large media coverage, including in Bel-
gium. One of the most extreme among these scientists is computer scientist Ray 
Kurzweil, hired by Google to lead Calico, a life science start-up. Kurzweil’s ambition is to 
achieve eternal life. Without going that far, National Geographic recently published a 
cover story «This baby will live to be 120» (May, 2013), claiming: «It’s not just hype. 
New science could lead to very long lives». 
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ty years ago, people are living much longer when they retire. This is 
then illustrated by the fact that male life expectancy in 1960 was about 
67 years and is 77 years today. Next, the need for raising the retirement 
age is directly linked to this evolution in life expectancy, asserting that 
at the moment of the introduction of the repartition system life expec-
tancy at birth was 65 years, whereas it is 80 years nowadays, and that 
the current repartition system is thus untenable (Peersman, Schoors, 
2012). 
The conclusion that we are living so much longer is based on a wrong 
interpretation of the concept of life expectancy. The spectacular growth 
in life expectancy at birth has fundamentally distorted popular and sci-
entific beliefs about changes in longevity and health, including those of 
demographers. In 1910, male life expectancy in Belgium at age 65 was 
11 years; now it is 17 years. At age 85, male life expectancy was 3.5 
years; now it is 5.3 years. We have clearly arrived at a point where the 
limits of old-age mortality have shifted towards a higher level, thanks to 
improved living conditions over the life course and to more efficient 
medical interventions. Yet, as a species we are not living that much 
longer. Although life expectancy at birth, the average length of life, was 
in all probability considerably lower in all past human history, this can-
not be said of human lifespan. Long lifespans have been typical of most 
humans since the late Middle Pleistocene (O’Connell et al., 1999). 
Different hypotheses try to explain these long (post-reproductive) lifes-
pans in humans in terms of evolutionary advantages, since it is now 
generally accepted that the length of the human lifespan is not genetical-
ly programmed. Given the inevitability of death, living organisms have 
to replicate and thus to adapt to their environmental conditions as to 
optimize reproduction (O’Connell et al., 1999). Carey and Judge (2001) 
explicitly exclude the existence of a species-specific fixed lifespan and 
consider lifespan as a life-history adaptation. In the past 100’000 years, 
our species has only known some small genetic modifications, allowing 
for diversified adaptation to the starkly divergent environments we 
have been living in. These small mutations explain divergence in human 
phenotypes, but not changes in humans’ fundamental cell metabolism, 
their typical lifespan and reproductive cycle. 
The acceptance that the length of the human lifespan is not genetically 
programmed does however not change the observation that «while bod-
ies are not designed to fail, neither are they designed for extended oper-
ation» (Carnes, Olshansky, 2007). The limits of longevity (the length of 
the human lifespan) have to be understood as the result of the probabil-
istic outcome «of the stochastic components of senescence» (Finch, 
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Kirkwood, 2000). Moreover, evolutionary aspects of longevity are in fact 
of little relevance for explaining the rise in life expectancy of the last 100 
years. 
Explanations for the recent rise in life expectancy  
There is still discussion on the precise mechanisms that eventually led 
to a rise in life expectancy. Yet, there is general agreement on the central 
role of scientific progress and technology, causing a surge in economic 
productivity and resulting in improved living standards. Regular access 
to high-calorie foods, improved sanitation, and a more efficient medical 
approach (vaccines, antibiotics, surgical interventions, etc.) have all 
been credited as contributors. The result has been a massive decline in 
premature mortality, with a shift from infectious to chronic diseases as 
the main causes of death. This process has been coined the «epidemio-
logical transition» by Abdel Omran (Omran, 1971). The recent progress 
in old-age survival is moving human longevity to a new frontier (Kannis-
to, 1994). This spurred several new discussions on the existence of a 
fixed lifespan, on the potential of healthy ageing or the compression of 
morbidity (Cheung, Robine, 2007; Fries, 1980; Fries, 2005b; Manton et 
al., 1999), and on the changing human body (Floud et al., 2011). 
Epigenetics is one of the theoretical paths developed in recent years to 
explain increased longevity (Gentilini et al., 2013). According to this 
theory, DNA remains unchanged but is modulated by biochemical sig-
nals. One of the processes involved is methylation, in which methyl 
groups attach themselves at the outside of the gene and change its re-
sponsiveness to biochemical signals. Diet and exercise are considered 
processes that could impact the methylation process. This process could 
explain the fact that, given our genetic predisposition, we can push the 
frontiers of health, at least at the individual level, but it does neither 
change the basic facts of life and death, nor the genetic information we 
will pass on to our children (Pagel, 2012; Stringer, 2011). 
What has often been overlooked in the process towards a higher life ex-
pectancy is the fact that all members of society have benefited from this 
process. Increasing life expectancy is first and foremost a social phe-
nomenon: it is the outcome of a collective process where the chances to 
live longer are distributed more evenly (or «shared») across the popula-
tion. Nowadays almost every child can live upon an older adult age and 
more than 90% of a birth cohort in Europe will live beyond the age of 
65, as illustrated by the evolution of the survival curves for Belgium 
between 1910 and 2010 (Figure 1). As an indicator of average years to 
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live, life expectancy is only marginally influenced by the oldest age 
groups, and depends heavily on how many newborns survive until a 
reasonably old age. In this respect, life expectancy is a product of sci-
ence and technology, but also of human solidarity. The strong increase 
in life expectancy from the 1880s onwards is intrinsically linked to the 
emergence of the labour movement, the introduction of social laws, and 
the development of a social security system. It is the result of the im-
plementation of technological progress in better living conditions and 
the fact that these improvements have been accessible for all. Our pen-
sion system is a keystone of our social security system. Its contribution 
to wellbeing and health is difficult to quantify, but the impact can surely 
not be underestimated, as 40% of the population declares to be in less 
than good health at age 60 (Deboosere et al., 2006). Allowing people to 
retire when work becomes mentally and physically too demanding is 
highly likely to add some extra years of healthy survival. 
FIGURE 1 Survival curves of Belgian women 1910-2010 
 
Data: Human Mortality Database. 
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
90000
100000
0 5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
3
0
3
5
4
0
4
5
5
0
5
5
6
0
6
5
7
0
7
5
8
0
8
5
9
0
9
5
1
0
0
1
0
5
1
1
0
+
N
 p
er
so
n
s 
su
rv
iv
in
g 
th
eo
re
ti
ca
l b
ir
th
o
f 
co
h
o
rt
 1
0
0
’0
0
0
Age
1910
2010
Patrick Deboosere, Hadewijch Vandenheede 
 
81 
FIGURE 2 Belgian men – age-specific contribution 
to the increase in life expectancy4 
 
Data: Human Mortality Database. 
A decomposition of the gains in life expectancy by age (Arriaga, 1984) 
demonstrates that 42% of the increase in life expectancy in Belgian men 
between 1910 and 1960 was due to a decrease in infant mortality (Fig-
ure 2). By contrast, in the same period life expectancy at 65 increased by 
1 year only: from 11 years in 1910 to 12.3 years in 1960. Still, the total 
gain in life expectancy at birth was an impressive 27.7 years. In the pe-
riod 1960-2010, life expectancy continued to increase, but at a slower 
rate than in the period 1910-1960: 10.7 years of life expectancy were 
added, instead of 27.7 in the first period. 50% of this progress took pla-
ce below the age of 5, mainly in the period before 1985. In 1985, life ex-
pectancy in Belgian men aged 65 reached 13.3 years. Compared to 1960, 
65-year-old Belgian men could expect to live one additional year. In 
2010, life expectancy at age 65 was 17.5 years, an increase of 4.2 years 
compared to 1985. This latter evolution implies an important shift in the 
pattern of mortality reduction, from mortality reductions in the young 
to mortality reductions in the elderly. In the last 25 years, more gains in 
life expectancy among men aged 65+ have been made than in the pre-
ceding 75 years. This overall pattern demonstrates furthermore that the 
                                                        
4. + 17 years in 1910-1960 & +10.7 years in 1960-2010; y-axis not fully shown as 
contribution under age 1 is more than 8 years for the 1910-1960 period. 
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shift of falling mortality rates in the young and adult population towards 
older adults is slowing down the progress in life expectancy in the coun-
tries with the highest life expectancy. Life expectancy at birth has risen 
more slowly in the last decades than before (Bongaarts, 2006), and in 
most countries there is a decline in its average increase from decade to 
decade (de Beer, 2006). 
What does this imply for the future evolution of life expectancy? 
Recently, the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute 
(NIDI) made life expectancy projections based on the assumption that 
life expectancy will continue to increase at the same rate as in the past: 
per annum, 0.3 years of life expectancy would be gained (de Beer, 
2013). Based on this assumption, at least 50% of all girls born today 
would live to be a 100, with life expectancy for women being 96 years. 
This line of thinking is based inter alia on the article by Jim Oeppen and 
James Vaupel, who concluded that «For 160 years, best-performance life 
expectancy has steadily increased by a quarter of a year per year, an 
extraordinary constancy of human achievement» (Oeppen, Vaupel, 
2002). However, these authors are slightly more prudent than de Beer 
by specifying that «an alternative method for forecasting life expectancy 
is to analyze the rapidity of improvement in age-specific death rates 
over many decades and then to use this information to project death 
rates over coming decades» (idem, p. 1’031). Using this approach, one 
arrives at considerably lower increases in life expectancy, as the factors 
responsible for the steady annual increase in life expectancy of the past 
are no longer present. Using the extrapolation method of life expectancy 
based on life expectancy increase in the last hundred years results in a 
life expectancy of 102 years for Belgian men in 2100. If the extrapola-
tion method is applied on a decrease in age specific death rates similar 
to the past hundred years life expectancy of Belgian men will reach 86 
years in 2100 (i.e. the current life expectancy of Japanese women). 
The reason for this difference lies in the properties of life expectancy as 
measure of mortality. Life expectancy is first and foremost a collective 
process. It is a social construct that measures to what extent a society is 
able to optimize the biological potential of the human species in an as 
long as possible life for all of its members. Increasing life expectancy is 
the result of improvements in the probability of surviving at all ages and 
for all members of a society. Each year added to the total number of 
years lived by each birth cohort improves the outcome. Yet, a first ele-
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ment to bear in mind is that the survival of a young person adds more to 
the increase in life expectancy than the survival of an older person. In 
the calculation of life expectancy, the survival of a baby during the first 
year of its life equals the gain in life expectancy of eighty eighty-year-
olds surviving one additional year. Hence, once mortality has dropped to 
extremely low levels at young and adult ages, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to realize further progress in life expectancy. Under the unreal-
istic hypothesis of a decrease to zero mortality for all persons under the 
age of 65, life expectancy of Belgian men and women can only increase 
by about 4.5 years. 
The «easy» wins have been spent and increasing life expectancy has to 
be realised in the older age groups. This is not impossible, but extending 
survival time in older age groups is simply more difficult because of the 
laws of nature. As mentioned above, we did not change the basics of cell 
metabolism nor did we improve organ renewal in the human body. The 
best we can do for now is repairing some ailing parts. Heart surgeries, 
joint replacements, cataract operations, etc. are all wonderful interven-
tions, pushing the rectangularisation of the survival curve into the old-
est old. This «manufactured survival time» (Olshansky, Carnes, 2001) is 
even adding some quality of life to old age, but the ageing process of the 
human body does not stop, ineluctably ending up in frailty and death. 
There is some elasticity to this ageing process: a healthier lifestyle cre-
ates more opportunities for healthier ageing (Fries, 2005a). Yet, even 
the rich and powerful do not transgress the natural laws. 
These biological constraints are translated in the entropy of the life ta-
ble (Olshansky, Carnes, 2001): «with improvement in mortality every-
one dies at about the same age, and a proportional improvement in mor-
tality at all ages makes less and less difference in the expectation of life» 
(Keyfitz, Caswell, 2005). There is no reason to impose an upper limit on 
life expectancy, as centenarians and super centenarians empirically 
prove that there is plenty of room for further progress. Still, it is not 
realistic that the per annum increase in life expectancy of the past fifty 
years will continue at the same rate in the next fifty years. Life expec-
tancy will continue to increase in the future, but even the more realistic 
scenario, based on lowering age-specific mortality rates in the next dec-
ades at the same rate as in the past, becomes increasingly difficult. It 
implies continuous and considerable progress in living conditions and in 
medical interventions, pushing the individual’s survival age upwards 
and dissipating this progress to all members of society; life expectancy 
is after all a collective process. 
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If we assume that age-specific mortality rates decline at the same rate as 
in the past 100 years, the increase in life expectancy in Belgium will at 
best be 0.1 year per annum in the next 100 years (own calculations). 
This is in line with the estimates of the United Nations Population Divi-
sion. For all developed regions of the world, the UN estimates that sys-
tematic progress against mortality will lead to a further increase of life 
expectancy by 0.13 years per annum, resulting in an actual life expec-
tancy at birth of 88.9 years in 2100 (United Nations, 2013). 
The ageing of a population is the result of more ageing individuals: sur-
viving longer, maybe healthier, but not escaping ageing. We marginally 
gain manufactured life in old ages, but with decreasing elasticity. Faster 
increases will need spectacular scientific breakthroughs (Vallin, Meslé, 
2010). As a retiree, one can count on a few years more, but not on 
adding an extra dozen years, and that will remain so in the near future. 
An additional question in this regard is how healthy these extra years 
will be. The debate on the expansion versus compression of morbidity 
related to an increased life expectancy started at the end of the seven-
ties (Fries, 1980), and empirical research is still on going (Crimmins, 
Saito, 2001; Jagger, Robine, 2011). Although there is some evidence that 
increases in life expectancy and in population health are narrowly inter-
twined, more uncertainty exists about the progress in health of the 
oldest old (Van Oyen et al., 2008). What is certain however – and very 
relevant when discussing the age of retirement –, is the fact that healthy 
life expectancy is extremely unevenly spread in the population accord-
ing to socio-economic status. Calculations for Belgium reveal a differ-
ence in healthy life expectancy of 10 years between higher educated and 
primary educated men. While higher educated men have a healthy life 
expectancy of 71.3 years, it is 61.6 years in men with only primary edu-
cation (Van Oyen et al., 2011). 
There is no reason to believe that progress in life expectancy will stop at 
a certain threshold, but a realistic forecast about the progress that can 
be realized in the near future assumes this to be relatively modest. The 
frontier of human lifespan is empirically fixed at 122 years, the record 
lifespan observed and fully documented (Maier et al., 2010). This record 
has been unbroken for 18 years, and it will stand for some more years, 
given the age of the oldest living people. That the current record will be 
broken is certain, as the number of super centenarians in the world is 
growing, However it is unclear when, and the estimates of the time 
needed to break this record demonstrate how near we are to the fron-
tiers of the human lifespan (Wilmoth, Ouellette, 2011). What we have 
been changing until now is the mean age of death, not its maximum. 
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Changes in this mean age of death do have an impact on the proportion 
of elderly in a population, with important economic consequences, an 
issue we will discuss in detail in part 3 and 4. 
The conclusion is clear: it is highly unlikely that age-specific mortality 
will decrease much faster in the future than in the past, unless spectacu-
lar breakthroughs in genetic engineering and medical interventions, 
with a direct impact on the ageing process, take place. The corollary of 
this conclusion is that the proportion of 65+ and 85+ will continue to 
increase in the near future, but that the prospect of unlimited ageing is 
an illusion. Of course, countries with a long history of below-replace-
ment fertility will, in absence of international immigration, end up with 
a high proportion of persons aged 65 and more. In a population with re-
placement fertility, population ageing will be more modest and the pro-
portion of 65-year-olds will not exceed 30% in the next century (Com-
mission, 2014; Uhlenberg, 2009). 
Is an ageing population sustainable? 
This brings us to the following question: can we support a population 
with 30% aged 65 or older? From a strictly theoretical point of view, 
this does not present a problem. Looking at the past, our wealth has 
increased substantially, while the number of working hours per person 
decreased dramatically. The key is productivity increase, and there is no 
reason to assume that our technological innovation will be halted in the 
future. We could use part of our future productivity increases to support 
higher pension costs. If we assume human ingenuity to continue extend-
ing human life, why could productivity not follow at the same pace? 
Still, using the demographic dependency ratio, it is often argued that we 
will have to postpone retirement age in order to be able to pay for fu-
ture pensions and to preserve the social security system «for our chil-
dren». The evolution of the dependency ratio and more particularly the 
old-age dependency ratio has indeed left many arguing that the rela-
tionship between the active population and the elderly dependent popu-
lation is not sustainable in the long run (Oeppen, Vaupel, 2002). 
In Belgium, the cost of future ageing has been quantified. In 2001, the 
Study Committee on Ageing, established within the High Council of Fi-
nance, was created in order to monitor the rising costs linked to popula-
tion ageing. The Committee is commissioned with drawing up an annual 
report on the budgetary and social consequences of ageing up to 2060. 
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The cost of ageing can be defined as the difference in budgetary trans-
fers for social expenses due to the change in population composition by 
age. Table 1 reproduces the synthetic table of the 2014 annual report of 
the Committee (Comité d’Étude sur le Vieillissement, 2014). 
TABLE 1 Reprint of the synthetic table of the 2014 report 
of the Study Committee on Ageing 
 
Source: Comité d’Étude sur le Vieillissement, 2014. 
The 2014 annual report predicts that the cost of ageing will increase 
over the period 2013-2060 to a total of 4.2% of GDP in 2060, a yearly 
increase of social expenses due to ageing of less than 0.1% over a period 
of almost 50 years. Recently, we have been hit by the banking crisis of 
2008. The effect of the crisis increased the expenses for social security 
in a single year with an estimated 3% of GDP (Comité d’Étude sur le 
Vieilissement, 2011). Of course, this crisis is making a balanced budget 
more difficult, but it also puts the ageing cost in perspective. The bank-
ing crisis of 2008 did make our social expenses soar overnight with 
more than half of the expected cost of ageing. (We are not even taking 
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into account the additional billions used by the Belgian government to 
save the banks). 
However, the most overlooked fact in this debate is the yearly increase 
of GDP as such. If we adopt the central assumption of the Study Commit-
tee on Ageing, which assumes an increase in productivity of 1.5%, we 
will double our purchasing power over the next fifty years5. What will 
we do with this additional wealth? Will we buy twice as many cars, build 
houses twice as big? Of course, there are still many other investments 
that can be made; however, the potential wealth created is, all things 
being equal, grossly underestimated when only the relative increase of 
the cost of ageing is taken into account. Doubling our GDP in the future 
will leave plenty of room for spending a few more percentages to sus-
tain an elderly population. 
To simplify the data of the Study Group on Aging, 26 euros of the 100 
euros of wealth produced in Belgium today is used to sustain its social 
security system (including expenses for pensions, for unemployment, 
for all kinds of allowances, and for health), with 74 euros going to all 
other needs (Comité d’Étude sur le Vieillissement, 2014). The cost of 
ageing will make our social security system much more expensive in the 
future. In fact, fifty years from now we will need 62 euros to sustain the 
system instead of the 26 euros today (Comité d’Étude sur le 
Vieillissement, 2014). Yet, the wealth to be produced will, all things be-
ing equal, have doubled to 200 euros; hence, the future generation will 
have 138 euros to spend on other needs, instead of the 74 euros today. 
The future increase – in the next 40 years or so – of the share of the po-
pulation above age 65 is comparable to the increase in dependent per-
son-years since the crisis of 1973. Indeed, when, instead of using the 
demographic dependency ratio, real age at retirement, unemployment 
and the average number of years Belgian youth is studying longer are 
taken into account, we end up with a completely different, more sustain-
nable picture. Additional years of education are a good investment, but 
are also proof of how increased economic dependency was sustainable, 
because it was accompanied by increased welfare. In all industrialized 
countries, the share of young adults in the labour force has been declin-
ing much faster than the share of young adults in the population. The 
mean age of entry into Belgium’s labour force increased by about 5 
                                                        
5. The Study Committee on Ageing uses the increase in productivity to estimate 
annual economic growth. With a yearly increase of 1.5%, GDP will double in exactly 46 
years. If we adopt the most pessimistic scenario of the Study Committee on Ageing, 
which estimates the annual increase to be 1.25%, the doubling time of GDP will be 56 
years. 
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years over the past 50 years (own calculations based on census data). 
The result has been a sharp decline in labour participation of young 
adults. The share in the labour force of men and women aged 20 to 24 
dropped from 13.9% in 1983 (first available data) to 7.4% in 2013. 
When adjusting for the declining population share of this age group, this 
represents a decline in labour force participation of 35% over 30 years 
(OECD, 2015). Consequently, in recent years several demographers 
claimed that the dependency ratio has been incorrectly interpreted, and 
insisted on the need to use more meaningful indicators when address-
ing economic questions (Deboosere et al., 2009; Lee, Mason, 2010; Rada, 
2013). 
If we take the capital accumulation (in buildings, infrastructure and so-
cial capital) of the past and the gains in productivity of the future into 
account, we can perfectly support the social security system. We have 
already done so in the past. The history of Europe in the past hundred 
years, notwithstanding wars and the major crisis of the thirties, has 
been one of constant progress in the welfare system, accompanied by a 
secular reduction in the number of hours worked. 
Why insist on the need to increase the mandatory retirement age? 
When carefully analysing the annual reports of the Study Committee on 
Ageing (Comité d’Étude sur le Vieillissement, 2013), one wonders why 
some economists insist on the need to increase the mandatory retire-
ment age (Wided, 2014); all the more so since the banking crisis of 2008 
evolved into a large unemployment crisis. The stubbornness of main-
taining this line of thinking in a time of towering unemployment levels 
in Europe suggests a strong ideological blindness. It hints towards a lo-
gic trapped into the dominant economic thinking of «supply sides eco-
nomics». From a conceptual point of view, there seems to be a clear cor-
relation between the TINA approach of working longer and the plea for 
tax cuts and fiscal austerity (Blyth, 2012; Council of the European Union, 
2002; Freyssinet, 2004). The austerity approach to the crisis is in fact 
very similar to the answer on how to tackle the cost of ageing popula-
tions. This approach is rooted in a profound misunderstanding of the 
current crisis. The main point is that the triggers of the crisis are mixed 
up with its deeper roots. Among the many triggers, deregulation, greed 
of the banking sector or the housing bubble are often put forward, and 
indeed played a major role in provoking and feeding the crisis; but the 
real problem of the crisis, its deeper roots, suggests a classic example of 
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«overproduction». The combination of too many highly productive wor-
kers and too few consumers creates a stalled economy. This does not at 
all imply that there are no needs anymore. Still, low incomes and unem-
ployment are not the best incentives for demand. The huge accumula-
tion of richness in the hands of a very small group cannot substitute the 
demand for consumer goods. Quite the contrary, the increased income 
inequality and highly skewed wealth distribution add instability to the 
system, with huge amounts of capital in search of higher returns on in-
vestment (Galbraith, 2012; Spector, 2012). Keynes predicted in 1930 
that there would be a «fifteen-hour week» in 2030 – the ultimate out-
come of the increase in productivity (Keynes, 1963). He was surely 
overly optimistic and underestimated how technological and scientific 
progress would increase the demand for work, but the core of his think-
ing, a better redistribution of work and income, appears to be the only 
long-term solution. 
The argument of a «lack of labour force» – very popular in the retire-
ment debate before 2008 – has now completely disappeared from the 
discussion on ageing. Insisting on «working longer» has become particu-
larly insane in a Europe with millions of unemployed. Belgium has done 
relatively well compared to other countries. Still, the Belgian unem-
ployment rate in 2013 was either 8% or 12.1%, depending on the data 
source used (European Union based on the Labour Force Sample Survey 
or administrative data respectively). The insistence on the need to in-
crease the mandatory retirement age reveals what it always has been: 
merely an operation to slash pension costs. In the Belgian context, it is 
difficult to explain the added value or the economic rationality of in-
creasing the mandatory retirement age with 2 years, when the mean age 
at retirement is 60 years and when more than half a million persons are 
unemployed. An increase of the retirement age with two years implies 
that more than 300’000 additional workplaces have to be created. The 
National Bank of Belgium forecasts a maximum creation of 59’000 jobs 
over the next five years (National Bank of Belgium, 2014), a figure large-
ly contested by the Federal Planning Bureau. Yet, the economists of the 
Federal Planning Bureau do accept job creation in the long run based on 
the hypothesis that growth is induced through supply of labour (Bureau 
fédéral du Plan, 2015). 
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The role of demography 
In hindsight, modern demography has been extremely powerful in fram-
ing the need of «structural reforms», which has served mainly as «a code 
phrase for deregulation» (Krugman, 2013) and for slashing social secu-
rity by presenting reforms as a demographic imperative. 
It is instructive to look at the historical parallel with Robert Malthus, a 
typical protagonist of apocalyptic demography. Malthus is well known 
because of his population theory, but his work was used in the first 
place to abolish the Poor Laws in the UK. The origin of the English Poor 
Laws goes back to the 14th century and was codified at the end of the 
16th century. It was conceived against beggars and migrant vagabonds, 
but installed a system of parish-based relief for the poor. The Poor Law 
was extremely important in times of bad harvest to help the poorest 
farmers. Malthus considered that the Poor Law subsidised marriage 
between paupers and for English industrialists the Poor Law retained 
too many impoverished farmers in the countryside. Malthus argued that 
the Poor Law contributed to maintaining poverty. We probably underes-
timate that it was «his perversity thesis that arguably changed the cour-
se of history [...] converting the poor from a structural position to a be-
havioral choice» (Somers, Block, 2005). 
Population ageing worldwide is the only possible demographic outcome 
of the end of world population growth. Longevity and lower fertility are 
changing the classic population pyramid into a population rectangle. 
Yet, it is not because the demographic outcome is inevitable that there is 
only one possible societal answer. The future of mankind is inextricably 
linked to the end of population growth and, perhaps even more so, to 
our ability to change extensive economic growth into sustainable 
growth rather than unilaterally increasing GDP through export and com-
petition. 
Some people may wish to work longer, because they feel the need to 
keep busy or because they enjoy the social contacts. Yet, we cannot con-
fuse a question of choice with a question of need. To impose work on the 
elderly as a condition to have an income is shameful and economically 
counterproductive; it will not solve any problems in modern societies, 
only create more. There is of course room for discussion about the op-
timal retirement age in any given society. Yet, facts point to the urgent 
need to rethink work and income distributions in the modern econo-
mies of today rather than to increase the retirement age. The impact of 
information technology and robotics has only started to change manu-
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facturing. This evolution will not stop and each hour of labour input will 
produce an increasing amount of output. Of course, output will shift 
towards more sophisticated products and our new production mode 
will need more highly skilled workers. The fundamental challenge with-
in this new economic paradigm however will be to create an inclusive 
society (OECD, 2014). In the meantime, we have to make the right 
choices in reorienting our economy and our production process towards 
low-carbon technologies (IPCC, 2014). Provided that we make the right 
choices, we now have the opportunity to change society for the better 
while improving life for all, to the benefit of both this and the next gen-
eration. An early retirement age and more free time for working-age 
adults are available options. Although this requires a fundamental re-
thinking of taxation policies, as it runs against the widespread «anti-tax-
ation» ideology. 
Malthus has proved to be fundamentally wrong about the fact that tech-
nology and human inventiveness could tackle his «natural law», i.e. the 
tendency of all animated life to replicate itself beyond the means availa-
ble for its subsistence. In this regard, the challenge of ageing popula-
tions is very similar. For much of the apocalyptic demography (or econ-
omy!) today, the error in reasoning is even worse. Indeed, if we believe 
that medical progress can further increase life expectancy in the future, 
why should technological innovation and productivity not be able to 
match this progress? 
The Malthusian paradigm makes it hard to admit that we have to work 
less to enjoy the fruits of our labour. Our analysis calls for a reversal of 
the paradigm: we are living longer, because we are working less during 
our lifetime and do so in much better conditions. 
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